Using Secure DisCSP Solvers for Generalized Vickrey Auctions
Complete and Stochastic Secure
Techniques
Marius
C. Silaghi
Abstract
Within incentive auctions, several bidders cooperate for
clearing a set of offers or requests formalized by an auctioneer,
ensuring that each participant cannot do better than by inputing his
true utility. We use a distributed weighted constraint satisfaction
(DisWCSP) framework where the actual constraints are secrets that are
not known by any agent. They are de ned by a set of functions on the
secret inputs from all agents. The solution is also kept secret and
each agent learns just the result of applying an agreed function on the
solution. We show how to apply this framework for modeling and solving
General Vickrey Auctions (GVAs). Solutions based on secure complete
algorithms as well as solutions using faster secure stochastic
algorithms are proposed.