• Calendar

June 23, Thursday
12:00 – 14:00

In modern network settings, secure protocols are run concurrently with other arbitrary protocols. The interaction of different protocols with each other can be exploited by malicious parties to successfully attack the protocols, even if each protocol is secure when considered in isolation. To make things worse, adversarial parties may design and release "malicious" protocols whose sole purpose is to interact with secure protocols and compromise their security. In fact, it has been shown that in modern network settings like the Internet, it is easy to launch such attacks on real protocols.

In this talk, we discuss recent progress on a research project whose focus is the development of a theory for analyzing the security of protocols under these and other attack scenarios. We present definitions of security for different types of protocol composition, where many (possibly different) protocols are run concurrently in a network. We then discuss a number of positive and negative results regarding the feasibility of achieving security under these definitions. Finally, we will discuss research goals for the future.

Bio:

Yehuda completed his Ph.D. at the Weizmann Institute under the supervision of Oded Goldreich and Moni Naor. Following that, he was a PostDoc in the cryptography group at the IBM T.J.Watson Research Lab in New York. He is now currently a faculty member in the Computer Science department at Bar-Ilan University.